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 This study analyzes the reactions of equity holders and bondholders to the announcement 
of 427 preferred stock issues. We document an average equity announcement effect of −0.65%. 
This reaction is positively influenced by a number of measures of firm creditworthiness and 
transparency and is higher for bank issuers. The equity market reaction is negatively influenced 
by convertibility (and the moneyness of the embedded option) and by the firm's accounting 
treatment of the issue (specifically if the issue is classified as equity). We find that average credit 
default swap spreads decrease by 50 basis points after the issue announcement. This decrease is 
also larger for more creditworthy and transparent firms. Convertibility and the moneyness of the 
embedded option further decrease the CDS spread. In aggregate, the decrease in equity value is 
much smaller than the increase in the value of the issuer's debt. 
 
Keywords: preferred stock, capital structure, credit default swap 
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Preferred Stock: Some Insights into Capital Structure 
Introduction 
 A key part of the TARP capital purchase program in Fall 2008 was the purchase of $250 
billion of senior preferred shares from qualifying U.S.-controlled financial services companies. 
While this infusion of capital did much to avoid a market failure, shareholders of these financial 
institutions were not universally in favor of the decision because of the high dividend rates and 
the warrants granted to the government. Veronesi and Zingales (2010) document that the 
"winners” were bondholders of the largest investment banks and the major "losers” were J. P. 
Morgan equity investors and (naturally) U.S. taxpayers. 
 On November 17, 2010, as part of its IPO, General Motors issued 87 million shares of 
mandatory convertible, junior preferred stock, raising a total of $4.35 billion. Earlier, on August 
18, 2010, Bloomberg News noted that: The preferred shares were added to attract hedge funds 
and other new investors because the shares have attributes of both debt and equity, the people 
familiar with the plans said.1 This differing influence of preferred stock issuance on equity and 
debt investors is the focus of this study. 
 This paper thus addresses one of the most important areas of corporate finance: capital 
structure. The academic research ranges from the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
to the theoretical development of Hart (1995) and many others, to a huge volume of empirical 
studies. Almost all of this research has focused on the debt versus equity decision, leaving aside 
the issue of preferred stock. This is an important omission since preferred stock is an essential 
source of capital for many U.S. corporations. For example, over the 1999 to 2005 period studied 
in this paper, U.S. firms filed to issue over $868 billion in straight and convertible preferred 
                                                          
1 Bloomberg News, August 18, 2010. 
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stock. In comparison, U.S. firms filed to raise $374 billion through IPOs and $590 billion 
through SEOs2 over this period.3 
 As noted above, preferred stock played a central role in mitigating the recent financial 
crisis. A prominent pair of examples occurred in October, 2008, with Warren Buffett's infusion 
of $3 billion into GE and $5 billion into Goldman Sachs, both investments in the form of 
perpetual preferred stock with warrants. This was the harbinger of many bank preferred issues 
during and following the financial crisis. These issues were often perceived as a financing of last 
resort. The bank securities often took the form of trust preferred, a recent innovation using a 
special purpose vehicle, which has spurred the recent growth in preferred stock issuance by both 
banks and corporations.4 
 The hybrid nature of preferred stock is an important issue; it is neither equity nor debt, 
which creates ambiguity about its impact on firm value and the potential reactions of various 
firm stakeholders. Evidence of its hybrid nature can be seen from the differences between a 
firm's preferred stock ratings and the ratings on its subordinated debt issues, which are most 
significant for lower credit quality firms.5 Furthermore, firms vary in their accounting treatment 
of a preferred issue; some firms considering it as equity, some as debt and others as hybrids. 
 This paper empirically analyzes 427 preferred stock issues. Its goal is to determine the 
short-term reaction of equity holders and of bondholders. It is reasonable to believe that, because 
of their different relative positions with respect to preferred stock in the event of bankruptcy, 
bondholders and equity holders would have varying responses to the announcement of a 
                                                          
2 Source: Securities Data Company (SDC). 
3 In contrast, Bajaj et al. (2002) document that during the 1985-1999 period, capital raised through SEOs 
was almost twice the dollar volume raised through straight and convertible preferred stock combined. 
4 The recent trends in domestic preferred stock issuance have been quite dramatic. In 2008, $77.9 billion 
was issued, the highest amount ever, but this figure fell to $9.6 billion in 2009, the lowest amount issued 
since 1990. In 2011 the total issuance of preferred stock was $13.3 billion. These data are from sifma.org. 
5 Moody's Investors Services (1998). 
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preferred issue. We measure the reaction of equity holders using event study methodology. If 
equity holders viewed preferred as equity, one would expect that the announcement effect would 
be negative.6 Conversely, if equity holders perceive preferred as straight debt, we would expect 
to see an insignificant reaction, as is observed for public debt issues.7 
 The response of bondholders is evaluated using changes in the credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads.8 This approach has been shown to be superior to an analysis of bond yields, since the 
latter contain many confounding effects. Furthermore, CDS spreads have been shown to 
anticipate bond rating changes.9 After the announcement, one could expect CDS spreads to 
narrow because of the decrease in leverage. Conversely, bondholders could perceive the 
increased commitment to pay preferred dividends as an additional constraint on the firm's ability 
to service its debt. Furthermore, the choice of preferred rather than debt could be interpreted as a 
signal of financial distress, as was clear during the financial crisis. 
 Based on the studies outlined briefly in the following section, the two major hypotheses 
analyzed in this study are the following, although it is important to note that these hypotheses 
are, in general, extrapolated from theoretical and empirical research that focuses on the debt-
equity decision, rather than research that directly addresses preferred stock. 
Bondholder hypothesis: When a firm announces an issue of preferred stock its 
bondholders react favorably. The issue decreases both the firm's leverage and its financial 
distress risk. If the firm has higher earnings potential, bondholders will react more 
positively, since this makes the financing of last resort motive less credible. 
                                                          
6 See Masulis and Korwar (1986) for the announcement effect of seasoned equity issues. 
7 See Eckbo (1986). However, more recently, Cai and Zhang (2011) find increases in leverage, especially 
for highly leveraged firms, lead to lower stock returns. 
8 The role of CDS spreads as early indicators of financial distress is discussed in Longstaff (2009). 
9 See Hull et al. (2004) and Ericsson et al. (2009). 
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Stockholder hypothesis: When a firm announces an issue of straight preferred stock, its 
equity holders have an insignificant reaction. The issue creates no dilution and it reduces 
the potential adverse selection problems between managers and shareholders. However, 
for distressed firms, shareholders could react negatively because of the possible wealth 
transfer from shareholders to bondholders.10 Since convertible issues potentially create 
dilution, shareholders should react negatively to these issues; this reaction would depend 
on the moneyness of the embedded option. 
 The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a very brief 
review of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data and the sample selection process. 
Section 4 presents the estimation and interpretation of our results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
Literature review 
 There is significant theoretical and empirical support for the positive impact of preferred 
stock issuance. The theoretical model of Heinkel and Zechner (1990) shows that preferred stock 
increases the debt capacity of a firm given that a firm can delay preferred dividends. Similarly, 
Nance et al. (1993) argue that preferred stock reduces the probability of financial distress.11 
Pinegar and Lease (1986) examine the impact of preferred-for-common exchange offers and find 
a systematic increase in the value of the firm. Conversely, Irvine and Rosenfeld (2000) find that 
firms that use preferred stock to retire bank debt experience a negative shock to their stock 
prices. 
                                                          
10 A behavioral viewpoint on bondholder-shareholder conflicts, leverage and stock prices is presented in 
Hackbarth (2009). 
11 See Blau and Fuller (2008) for a development of the link between financial flexibility and dividend 
payments. 
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 The issue of information asymmetry has been an important component of this strand of 
the academic literature. Chandy et al. (1993) find that firms with higher information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders experience a relatively larger negative stockholder reaction 
when its preferred stock is downgraded. Chemmanur and Liu (2006) construct a theoretical 
model of security issuance based on heterogeneous beliefs between the insiders (existing equity 
holders) and outsiders (new investors). They find that if the level of heterogeneity in beliefs is 
high, the firm will not issue equity. Similarly, Dittmar and Thakor (2007a, b) develop a theory to 
explain security issuance based on market perception. They show that if the expectations of the 
market and the firm's managers are similar, the firm will issue equity, otherwise it will choose 
debt. In a related study, Chemmanur, Nandy and Yan (2003) provide empirical empirical support 
for this notion. 
 The literature also indicates that preferred issues by banks are viewed differently from 
other issues. Fields and Webb (1997) examine shareholder wealth effects of the announcement of 
straight preferred stock issues made by financial institutions and find no increase in the value of 
common stock. Benston et al. (2003) examine bank holding companies and find that regulatory 
capital requirements can have a significant positive effect on the demand for capital, and that 
growth and investment opportunities do not have a significant effect on the demand for capital. 
Kim and Stock (2012) examine the impact of TARP preferred stock issuance on existing 
preferred shares. They find that the overall impact is positive on existing preferred shares, 
especially in the case of preferred stockholders of banks that issued voluntarily and banks that 
issued trust preferred stock.12 Finally, Harvey et al. (2003) address the impact of the issuance of 
Trust Preferred Securities on both debt and equity for banks. They find that there is a positive 
                                                          
12 The TARP program required a number of the largest financial institutions to issue preferred shares. 
Subsequently, a significant number of other banks voluntarily issued TARP preferred stock. 
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impact on both classes of securities. Our study differs from theirs in numerous ways. Firstly we 
address all types of preferred stock issuers, not just banks. We use CDS spreads to gauge the 
impact on bondholders and we consider all types of preferred issues. 
 In summary, these theoretical and empirical studies present a mixed picture of the 
benefits of issuing preferred stock. The goal of this study is to attempt to present an alternative 
empirical perspective by analyzing different stakeholders' reactions to the same preferred issue. 
Furthermore, by analyzing both straight and convertible preferred, we can analyze a spectrum of 
varying degrees of “equityness” in the preferred issue.13 
 
Data and sample selection 
 The preferred stock issues were obtained from the SDC Platinum database for the years 
1999 through 2005,14 yielding 1211 filings for a total of $680 billion. Announcement dates are 
from the Factiva newswire. Table 1 reports the details of the overall dataset and the number of 
firms remaining after each filter. After matching to CRSP and Compustat, 643 issues remained. 
After the remaining filters, shelf filings, elimination of multiple preferred stock issues (only the 
issue corresponding to the initial announcement date is considered), issues for refinancing and 
closed end funds,15 we are left with a sample of 427 issues. 
  Sample composition 
 Table 2 shows the distribution of firms and events, in the cross-section and across time of 
the six classes of firms analyzed: 
                                                          
13 Note that we are not attempting to determine the optimal use of preferred stock in the capital structure. 
Rather our emphasis is on the issuance's impact on various stakeholders. A REIT capital structure 
analysis including preferred stock is presented in Boudry et al. (2010). 
14 The data start in 1999 to coincide with the availability of our credit default swap spread data. 
15 Since our theories of capital structure do not readily apply to closed-end funds, and there are no credit 
default swap data for them, they are excluded from our final sample. 
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Banks: This category contains savings and loan institutions, commercial banks and other 
financial institutions. They constitute 15.5% of the sample. Banks are treated as a 
separate group for the majority of our empirical analysis due to their regulatory structure. 
Utilities: These are electric service, transportation, construction and gas distribution 
firms. They constitute 12.7% of the sample. 
REITs: Because of their (essentially) tax-exempt status and their lack of internal cash 
flow (due to dividend payout restrictions) real estate investment trusts (REITs) are the 
largest group in our sample, comprising 43.8% of the issues. 
Insurance: Insurance firms represent 9.6% of the sample. 
Investment Banks: Investment banks form 4.2% of the sample. 
Industrials: These firms are 14.3% of our sample. Interestingly, industrials issued no 
straight preferred during this time period. 
 Table 2 further shows the time series variation in issuance volume. It demonstrates that 
the issue distribution is relatively uniform over the sample period. The largest number of issues 
(19.4%) was in 2004. The smallest percentage was in 2000 (7.7% of the total), largely due to the 
small number of REIT issues in that year, which coincides with the end of the bull market in real 
estate. In our sample, the mean book leverage is 75% and the minimum leverage is 25%. The 
bond ratings range from AA+ for banks to CCC+ for some REITs and utilities. This suggests that 
the sample does not contain too many financially distressed firms and that debt is a viable 
alternative to preferred stock for many of these firms. 
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  Accounting treatment of preferred issues 
 Given the hybrid nature of preferred stock, it is reasonable that the accounting treatment 
of a new issue is relevant.16 For each issue we searched the 10Ks and financial statements to 
determine how the issue was classified into the 3 possibilities: debt, equity or hybrid. We were 
able to determine the accounting treatment for all 427 issues in our sample. 
 The preferred issues were divided as follows: in 120 cases, the firm unambiguously 
classified the issue as debt. Another 139 issues were classified as equity if preferred stock was 
listed in stockholder's equity in the balance sheet and there was no indication that it was used as 
leverage nor any mention of the dividend payments being included in fixed charges. The 
preferred issue is deemed to be a hybrid (In 168 cases) if the issuing firm recognizes that 
preferred stock is a debt type instrument or if they use it as a form of leverage, even though they 
include it in the stockholder equity portion of the balance sheet. We also classified issues as 
hybrids if the issuer listed preferred stock as a separate line item instead of including it either as 
debt or as equity. Table 3 shows the breakdown of our sample by the issue's accounting 
treatment. While there appears to be some commonality by industry, there is still substantial 
variation across issuer groups. 
  Variables and hypotheses 
 The cross-sectional variables analyzed were obtained from COMPUSTAT, CRSP and 
I/B/E/S.17 The debt analysis used credit default swap spread data from Lombard Risk — Value 
Spread Credit Data Services. All accounting data are from the year prior to the issue 
announcement. 
                                                          
16 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this area of research. 
17 For COMPUSTAT items, if data were missing for the year prior to the event year, they were obtained 
from the earliest available prior year. The maximum lag was 2 years. Data were available for every event 
within that timeframe with around 65% coming from the first lagged year. 
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Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR): The interest coverage ratio is EBIT divided by the total 
interest expense. Higher values of ICR should lead to a more positive announcement 
effect by decreasing the probability of wealth transfers from stockholders to bondholders. 
If bondholders believe that the proceeds of the issue will be used for positive NPV 
investments, we would expect the CDS spreads to be narrower for issuers with a high 
ICR ratio.18 
We include 3 measures of information asymmetry: (i) Dividend to Free Cash Flow Ratio, 
the higher the ratio, the lower is the information asymmetry. (ii) Number of Analysts: 
This is the number of analysts that provided long-term earnings estimates for the firm in 
the year prior to the announcement. The higher the number of analysts the lower the 
information asymmetry. (iii) Earnings to Price: This is the average forecasted long-term 
earnings per share from I/B/E/S divided by the market price of a share of the firm at the 
end of the year prior to the event year. The higher the future earnings potential, the lower 
will be the information asymmetry, as well as the agency problems between shareholders 
and managers. In each of these cases, lower information asymmetry should be positively 
related to the announcement effect (i.e., make it less negative) and negatively related to 
CDS spreads (i.e., make the spread narrower). 
Credit Watch: Preferred stock issues are usually rated by one of the two major fixed 
income rating agencies. After the initial preferred stock rating, within a week, firms are 
placed on credit watch for a possible revision of their overall credit rating by Moody's or 
Standard and Poors.19 Three possible actions can be taken by the credit rating agencies: 
                                                          
18 The interest coverage ratio values are winsorized at 90%: 5% at the low tail and 95% at the high tail. 
19 The credit watch data were obtained from the web sites of Moody's and Standard and Poors. 
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a. Firm is on credit watch for possible upgrade 
b. Firm is on credit watch for possible downgrade 
c. Firm's credit conditions are stable and they are not on credit watch. 
If a firm undergoes action a, the Credit Watch variable takes on a value of 1. For actions 
b and c, the Credit Watch variable takes values — 1 and 0 respectively. The Credit Watch 
variable captures the expected change in the debt servicing capability of a firm. 107 firms 
were placed on credit watch within the week following their preferred stock issue. 57 
were placed on credit watch for a possible upgrade; 50 were placed on credit watch for a 
possible downgrade. The Credit Watch variable should have a positive impact on the 
announcement effect and should decrease the CDS spread. 
Moneyness: Moneyness is defined as the share price at the issue date divided by the 
conversion price of the option embedded in the convertible preferred stock.20 Greater 
moneyness should decrease both the equity announcement effect and the CDS spread. 
PREF: This is a dummy variable set to 1 if the firm issued trust preferred stock and 0 
otherwise. Based on the analysis of Harvey et al. (2003) and Kim and Stock (2012), we 
would expect that this variable would increase the announcement effect and decrease the 
CDS spread. 
Mandatory: The convertible subsample included 48 issues of mandatory convertibles. 
These are convertibles that are forced to convert to equity within a relatively short 
timeframe (typically less than four years) and are thus more like a delayed equity issue 
than the standard covertible preferred. Huckins (1999) shows that the announcement 
effect of a mandatory convertible preferred is insignificant overall, and is positive for low 
                                                          
20 By definition, straight preferred stocks have a moneyness value of zero. 
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risk firms.21 This dummy variable is set to one for issues of mandatory convertible 
preferred. We expect that this dummy would decrease both the announcement effect and 
the CDS spread. 
Bank: This dummy variable is set to one for issues by banks.22 Based on the analysis of 
Benston et al. (2003) as well as Kim and Stock (2012), we would expect this dummy to 
increase the announcement effect and decrease the CDS spread. 
Convertible: This dummy variable is set to 1 for issues of convertible debt. As with 
mandatory convertibles, we would expect convertible issues to decrease both the 
announcement effect and the CDS spread. 
Debt and Equity: These are dummy variables set to 1 if the preferred issue is accounted 
for as debt or equity, respectively. We expect that issues classified as equity would 
decrease both the announcement effect and the CDS spread. 
Market cap: Market capitalization is included as, i.a., a proxy for risk and liquidity. We 
would expect that higher market cap would increase the announcement effect and 
decrease the CDS spread. 
 We also include year dummies. During this sample period, interest rates were, on 
average, lower than the previous decade, and it is plausible that preferred issuance may be 
negatively correlated with interest rates. While we have already eliminated firms that have 
simply issued preferreds to refinance, the year controls should capture this effect. 
  
                                                          
21 A theoretical development of mandatory convertible issuance is presented in Chemmanur et al. (2003). 
22 Dummy variables for other issuer types were initially included as further controls but these dummies 
were never significant. 
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 Performance measures 
 The change in the credit default spread measures the short-term impact of the preferred 
issue on bondholders. We use the standard event study methodology to evaluate the short-term 
impact on shareholders.23 The dependent variables are the following: 
Default Spread: We use the one-year average credit default swap spread for each issue.24 
This maturity was chosen to match the short-term impact as measured in the 
announcement effect. Lombard Risk calculates the mean and dispersion of the default 
spread from the data contributed by key market makers. To calculate the change in credit 
risk, we subtract the average CDS spread following the announcement of preferred stock 
issue from the average CDS spread prior to the event. There are 110 matches for the 
preferred stock issues. The total number of unique firm matches was 102. Table 4 shows 
the CDS distribution. 
Abnormal returns: We use a four-factor model with Fama-French and momentum 
factors. The value-weighted CRSP return index is used as the market return. The 
estimation window is (— 300, — 46).25 
 The explanatory variables were checked for cross-sectional correlation to avoid multi-
collinearity biases in the estimation. The only significant correlation was between the forecasted 
earnings to price ratio and the dividend to free cash flow ratio. This correlation is — 12%, which 
is not large enough to create multi-collinearity bias in the estimation. 
  
                                                          
23 In an analysis not reported here, we use both market and accounting performance measures to show that 
the difference in long-run performance between preferred stock issuers and non-issuers is insignificant. 
These results provide no evidence for market timing by preferred issuers. 
24 See Longstaff et al. (2005) for an analysis of CDS spreads and liquidity. The role of recovery rates in 
CDS pricing is analyzed in Schneider et al. (2011). 
25 The minimum estimation period for each calculation is fixed at 10 days to avoid noisy estimates of the 
coefficients and the abnormal returns. 
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 Empirical results and interpretation 
 The results of the event study based on the announcement dates from Factiva are 
summarized in Table 5. The event windows used in the full sample analysis are (— 3, — 2), (— 
1, 1), (2, 3) and (2, 4). Cumulative Abnormal Return is the equally-weighted cumulative 
abnormal return of a portfolio of firms over the return window.26 Positive: Negative is the 
number of positive and negative abnormal returns of the individual stocks. 
 Panel A of Table 5 shows that the abnormal returns are negative and significant only for 
the (—1,1) window. Event windows that do not contain the announcement date are all 
insignificant. This average CAR, — 0.65% while significant at the 1% level, is closer to the 
typical stockholder reaction to debt issues and smaller than the normal reaction to seasoned 
equity issues, which fall in the range of — 3% to — 7%.27 
 Our results suggest that, on average, equity holders do not view preferred stock issues as 
excessively dilutive or as a sign of financial distress. From this analysis we can estimate that the 
average market value of equity decreases by $27 million (based on the cumulative abnormal 
return of — 0.65% and average equity market capitalization of firms in the sample) after the 
announcement of a preferred stock issue. 
 The analysis of CDS spreads is presented in Panel B Table 5. The key finding is that 
there is a 19% decrease (49.8 basis points) in the average default spread. The dispersion in 
default spreads decreases by 16%. Both values are statistically significant at the 5% level. These 
results imply a short-term reduction in credit risk and in its variation. 
 Panel C then partitions the CARs over the (—1,1) event window and changes in CDS 
spreads by issue and issuer type. We find that bank issues had a 1.36% more positive equity 
                                                          
26 The tails are winsorized at 98% to avoid extreme outliers. 
27 See, for example, Masulis and Korwar (1986). 
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market reaction than non-bank issues. TPS issues had a 0.99% higher CAR than non-TPS issues, 
consistent with Kim and Stock (2012). As expected, due to the potential for dilution, convertible 
issues have a CAR 3.78% lower than straight preferred issues. Interestingly, the accounting 
treatment also had a significant impact on the CARs. Issues accounted for as debt had a 0.96% 
higher CAR than issues treated as equity. All of these 4 differences are significant at the .05 level 
and all but the TPS/non-TPS difference are significant at the .01 level. 
 Columns 4 to 6 in Panel C show that these characteristics seem to play a less important 
role for bondholders than for stockholders. Here the differences are quite small and none are 
significant at the .01 level. The only significant difference at the .05 level occurs for banks issues 
(12.98 bp reduction) and for issues treated as debt (11.06 bp reduction). The next two sections 
further explore how these issue and issuer characteristics influence the reaction of stockholders 
and bondholders. 
 Cross-sectional analysis of CARs 
 The cross-sectional analysis from the equity perspective is presented in the second 
column of Table 6.28 We find that the number of analysts, earnings-to-price ratio, the interaction 
between the earnings-to-price ratio and the number of analysts, ICR, the Credit Watch and Bank 
dummies have a positive and significant relation with the abnormal returns. The positive and 
significant sign on the earnings-to-price ratio suggests that equity holders of firms with good 
investment opportunities view the preferred issuance more favorably. The greater the number of 
analysts covering a firm and the higher the earnings potential of the firm as certified by those 
analysts, the less the information asymmetry, resulting in a more positive reaction. The ICR and 
                                                          
28 All the regressions include the controls discussed above, although these controls have no statistical 
significance. 
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Credit Watch dummy both have a positive effect. This is consistent with the notion that for firms 
with lower distress risk, equity holders view preferred stock more favorably. 
 The Money, Mandatory and Convertible dummies are all negatively related to abnormal 
returns, not surprisingly, since issues that have a greater potential for stock dilution should be 
viewed more negatively by shareholders. The significant positive coefficient on the Bank 
dummy implies that equity markets react more favorably to banks issuing preferred shares than 
to other industries. This is consistent with the results of Benston et al. (2003). The accounting 
treatment of the preferred issue also has a significant impact: the negative coefficient on the 
Equity dummy is consistent with the notion that shareholders react more negatively to more 
equity-like issues. The dummy variable for TPS is insignificant, suggesting that this innovation 
is not influencing our results. 
  Analysis of credit default swap spreads 
 The third column in Table 6 analyzes the determinants of the decrease in CDS spread. 
The signs on the variables related to creditworthiness and profitability are very similar to those 
from the equity market regression. The coefficients on variables that are associated with stronger 
or safer firms (number of analysts, earning to price ratio, Dividends over FCF ratio, Credit 
Watch, ICR and Market Cap) are positive and significant. Since the Money and Mandatory 
variables are both positive and significant, the possibility of future dilution also reduces the 
spread. The insignificant dummy for convertible issues combined with the positive and 
significant coefficients on Money and Mandatory imply that the structure of the convertible 
strongly influences the CDS spread. However, unlike column 2, none of the dummy variables 
characterizing TPS issues, bank issuers or the accounting treatment of the preferred issue are 
significant. 
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 The result that the CDS spread decline is larger for better firms is perhaps surprising. 
This observation suggests that the credit markets view the issuance of preferred stock by weaker 
firms as a form of financing of last resort. A firm with higher earnings potential has a higher 
likelihood of having sustainable cash flows, which leads to a decline in default spreads. In 
addition, as the information asymmetry between the manager and the bondholder declines, 
bondholders are more confident that the firm can satisfy its obligations to them. 
 We also performed two robustness checks, which are not detailed here. In the first 
analysis, the sample was partitioned into issues with the lowest and highest CDS spreads. The 
results were almost identical to those presented in Table 6, which suggests that the decline in the 
CDS spread is not limited to the highest risk firms. Since firms with CDS data are generally 
larger and more likely to be banks, there is a potential bias in the CDS analysis. We replicated 
the regression in Table 6 excluding banks.29 Other than a slight reduction in statistical power, all 
of the key results are preserved. This similarity in the full sample and the non-bank sample 
highlights the fact that the benefit from issuing preferred stock is not coming from regulatory or 
other influences that are unique to financial institutions, but rather is a more general result. 
 The estimated reduction in CDS spreads implies that the average book value of debt 
increases by $152 million. This figure is based on the 50 basis point average decrease in the 
credit default swap spread, together with an estimated average bond duration of 4, and the 
average book value of debt of firms in our sample, $7.6 billion. This number is significantly 
higher than the estimated decrease in equity value of $27 million, indicating that the net short-
term effect of a preferred issue is to increase the firm value. 
  
                                                          
29 Once banks are excluded from the sample, there is an insignificant size difference between firms with 
CDS data and those without it. 
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 Conclusion 
 The academic literature on capital structure theory and empirical analysis has paid very 
little attention to the use of preferred stock, even though it is an important source of external 
financing and despite its impact on the financial crisis. This empirical study analyzes the 
reactions of equity holders and bondholders to the announcement of427 preferred stock issues. 
We document an average equity announcement effect of — 0.65%. This reaction is positively 
influenced by a number of measures of firm creditworthiness or transparency and is higher for 
bank issuers. The equity market reaction is negatively influenced by convertibility (and the 
moneyness of the embedded option) and by the firm's accounting treatment of the issue 
(specifically if the issue is classified as equity rather than as debt or as a hybrid). Based on the 
market capitalization of our sample firms, the issuance of preferred stock results in an average 
decline of $27 million in shareholder value. 
 We find that average credit default swap spreads decrease by 50 basis points after the 
issue announcement. Like the equity market reaction, this decrease is larger for more 
creditworthy and transparent firms. Convertibility and the moneyness of the embedded option 
further decrease the CDS spread. This decline in CDS spreads implies an average gain in book 
value of $152 million, 5.6 times the negative impact on the issuer's equity. This result implies 
that there is a net positive impact on firm value. Our analysis further demonstrates that these net 
gains are not due to regulatory effects (since the gains do not accrue only to banks) or to 
innovations in corporate structuring (since the TPS dummy is never significant). 
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Table 1. Data filters. The sample of preferred stock filings and issues was collected from the 
SDC database. These firms were then matched with CRSP for the daily returns data. The 
announcement dates were found through a Factiva news search based on the filing and issue 
dates. The number of unique announcements was identified by analyzing Factiva news 
announcements for the final sample. 
 
Stage Number of events Filters 
1 1211 Total number of issues recorded by SDC database 
2 643 Events that had a CRSP and Compustat match 
3 617 Firms that had shelf filings removed 
4 585 Re-financing (preferred for preferred) removed 
5 516 Number of unique announcements (events) 
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Table 2. Time-series and cross-section of preferred stock announcements. The number of firms 
that issued preferred stock between 1999 and 2005 here are split by year and type of issuer. The 
purpose of this table is to illustrate that the issues do not cluster around the years 2001 and 2002 
when the interest rates were the lowest. 
 
Year Banks Utilities REIT Insurance Inv. bank Industrial Total 
Percentage share 
of events 
1999 15 15 17 0 0 5 52 12.18% 
2000 5 12 6 6 1 3 33 7.73% 
2001 8 3 13 18 8 0 50 11.71% 
2002 13 8 19 2 3 23 68 15.93% 
2003 12 6 42 3 1 13 77 18.03% 
2004 2 3 65 2 4 7 83 19.44% 
2005 11 7 25 10 1 10 64 14.99% 
Total 66 54 187 41 18 61 
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Table 3. Accounting treatment of preferred. This table partitions the sample by the accounting 
treatment of the preferred issue. For each issue we searched the 10Ks and financial statements to 
determine how the issue was classified into the three possibilities: debt, equity or hybrid. 
 
 
 Preferred stock declaration in the 10K filings 
 Debt Equity Hybrid 
Banks 46 10 10 
Utilities 27 10 18 
REIT 25 73 89 
Insurance 11 12 16 
Investment bank 4 6 8 
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Table 4. Time series and cross section of CDS data. The number of CDS events in the cross 
section and time series is given below. REITs, banks and industrials were the only industry types 
in the sample that had CDS data. They were available during the years 2000 through 2005. The 
last column indicates the total number of preferred stock announcements in each year. A 
comparison of the number of CDS events with that of the total preferred stock announcements 
gives an estimate of the number of sample firms and events for which CDS data are available. 
 
 
Year Bank REIT Industrial Total CDS events 
Percentage 
share of events 
Total preferred stock ann. 
events 
2000 3 3 2 8 7.27% 33 
2001 4 4 2 10 9.09% 50 
2002 7 3 0 10 9.09% 68 
2003 8 10 15 33 30.00% 77 
2004 2 13 5 20 18.18% 83 









110  375 




40.91% 29.09%    
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Table 5. Cumulative abnormal returns around preferred issue announcements. An event-study 
was conducted based on the preferred issuance announcement dates found on Factiva newswire. 
The estimation window is (- 300, - 46). The estimation model is a four-factor model with Fama-
French and momentum factors. Value-weighted CRSP return index is the proxy for the market 
return. Event Window is the trading day window around the announcement date. Cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) is the equally-weighted abnormal return of a portfolio of firms over the 
return window. Positive: negative is the number of positive and negative abnormal returns of the 
individual firms that were used in calculating the abnormal returns. The difference in means test 
measures the difference in CARs by issuer/issue type. Panel A presents the aggregate data. Time 
to maturity is one yeara for the credit default swaps. Average default spread is the average of 
default spreads charged by the market maker. Percentage change in average default spread has 
been calculated based on the values of the last trading prior to the preferred stock announcement 
and the first trading date after the announcement. Panel A shows the full sample results for 
equity. Panel B represents the reaction to credit default swap spreads following the preferred 
stock issues. Panel C partitions the sample by issue and issuer type for both debt and equity 
reactions. We apply the difference in means test to determine if the means of the above sub-
groups are significantly different from each other. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% confidence levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: all preferred stock issue announcements — equity reaction 
Return window Cumulative abnormal return Positive: negative t-stat 
(-3,-2) -0.12% 200:227 -0.928 
(-1,1) -0.65% 190:237 -4.092*** 
(2,3) -0.14% 220:207 -1.093 
(2,4) 0.17% 201:226 -0.76 
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Panel B: all preferred stock issue announcements — debt reaction 
 Average default 
spread (bp) 
Dispersion of 
default spread (bp) 
Change in average 
spread 
Change in dispersion of 
default spread 
Average 49.78** 11.30 -19.00% -15.98% 
Median 19.96 2.90 -15.44% -14.30% 
Std 64.32 26.31 6.20% 6.75% 
Max 338.88 183.51 1.85% 1.06% 
Min 3.63 0.35 -37.14% - 36.77% 
 
 
Panel C: issues partitioned by issuer or issue type  
Issue/issuer type 
Equity reaction  Debt reaction 
CAR (-1,1) Difference in 
means 
 Average default 
spread (bps) 
Percentage change in 
average default spread 
Difference in 
means 
Bank issuer 0.50%** 1.36%***  56.27** -22.00% 12.98** 
Non-bank issuer - 0.86%** (3.22)  43.29** -16.51% (2.68) 
Trust preferred issue - 0.06% 0.99%**  51.09** -19.83% 2.62* 
Non-trust-preferred issue -1.05%** (2.14)  48.47** -17.29% (1.88) 
Straight preferred issue 0.30%* 3.78%***  49.40** -18.23% -2.98* 
Convertible preferred issue - 3.48%*** (4.38)  52.38** -20.19% (1.75) 
Issue treated as debt 0.07% 0.96***  55.31** -21.39% 11.06** 
Issue treated as equity - 0.89%** (3.14)  44.25** -17.08% (2.50) 
a In addition to one year credit default swaps, we tested the changes in spread for 3, 5, 7 and 10 year swaps and did 
not find any significant results. 
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Table 6. Cross-sectional regressions for equity and debt. The left hand side variable for the 
equity regression is the abnormal return from the event window ( -1,1). The left hand side 
variable for the debt regression is the decrease in average default spread (in basis points) for one-
year contracts. Intercept is the intercept term from the cross-sectional OLS regressions. NOA t- 1 
represents the number of analysts that followed a particular firm in the year prior to the preferred 
stock issue announcement. E/P t-1 represents the earnings to price ratio, where earnings is the 
average long-term earnings forecast across analysts, from IBES. ICR t- 1 is the interest coverage 
ratio. (DIV/FCF) t- 1 is the ratio of the total dividends paid out by the firm to free cash flow. 
Credit Watch is an indicator variable for possible rating changes. Money is the ratio of the 
current stock price to the conversion price at the announcement date. Market cap is the issuer's 
market capitalization. Mandatory, TPS, Bank, Convertible, Debt, Equity are all dummy variables 
with 1 indicating mandatory convertibles, TPS issues, bank issuers, Preferred accounted for as 
debt or as equity. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. a  
 Equity Debt 
Intercept  -0.045 0.009 
 (-0.330)  (0.856) 
NOA t-1 0.048*** 0.071*** 
 (3.926) (3.000) 
E/P x 102 t-1 3.984*** 4.748** 
 (3.000) (2.310) 
E/P x NOA x 102 t-1 0.090** 0.106** 
 (2.052) (2.712) 
ICR t-1 0.102** -0.023 
 (2.423) (-0.205) 
DIV/FCF t-1 -0.010 0.058*** 
 (-0.756) (3.582) 
Credit Watch 0.048** 0.124** 
 (2.341) (2.138) 
Money -0.117** 0.061** 
 (-2.006) (2.490) 
Mandatory -0.031* 0.040* 
 (-1.879) (1.723) 
Market cap 0.061 0.342** 
 (0.888) (2.504) 
TPS 0.015 0.017 
 (1.012) (0.786) 
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Bank 0.080** 0.012 
 (2.384) (0.913) 
Convertible -0.040* 0.010 
 (-1.642) (0.808) 
Debt 0.011 0.003 
 (0.749)  (0.320) 
Equity -0.117* 0.005 
 (-1.771) (0.276) 
No. obs.  427 110 
Adj. R-squared 0.420 0.328 
 
a Year dummies were included to capture/control for the year-specific macro-economic effects in 
all the cross-sectional regressions and were found to be insignificant. Industry dummies were 
also included in all the cross sectional regressions to capture industry-specific effects, but were 
found to be insignificant except for bank issuers. 
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